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“We shall never cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.”
--T.S. Eliot1

I.

INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1966, § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation (DOT)

Act of 19662 has been the subject of considerable debate within the transportation and
environmental communities. Section 4(f) was enacted during a time of growing
awareness and concern on the part of the public and its elected representatives in
preserving the environment and important historic sites from encroachment by and
possible destruction due to the growth of the transportation system.3 It declared that
"[i]t is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made
to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites."4 The section goes on to note that
transportation programs and projects that require the use of protected lands shall not
be approved unless "(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land;
and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm" to
1

Quotes of T.S. Eliot, The Quotations Page, available at
http://www.quotationspage.com/search.php3?Author-T.+S.+Eliot&file=other (last visited Aug. 8,
2004).

2

49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976).

3

See e.g., Highway Existence: -- 100 Years and Beyond: A Peaceful Campaign of Progress and
Reform: The Federal Highway Administration at 100, available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/infrastructure/rw93.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter FHWA
History].
4

49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2004). Note--for simplicity, this paper will generically refer to these types of
lands as "protected" lands.

5

these types of lands.5 Although there is little continuing debate as to the virtues of the
broad policy set forth by § 4(f), there has been much disagreement and discussion
within the affected legal and policy communities as to the exact meaning, application,
and reach of this important provision of law.6
Section 4(f) has also produced a considerable body of case law as the court
system has wrestled with many of the same issues debated within the environmental
and transportation policy communities, including the law's scope and application.7
This section also spawned the seminal administrative law case of Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe8 -- a case that is still viewed as a touchstone for the
interpretation of federal administrative law and environmental and transportation law
and policy9. While the interpretations rendered by the judicial system have not, as of
yet, translated into changes to the original statutory and regulatory scheme of § 4(f),
several legislative proposals are currently pending that would do precisely that-change the scope and application of § 4(f).10
The case law and policy debates on § 4(f) over the years have posed or raised
a number of questions and issues. For example: Why would such a seemingly
beneficial policy of preventing harm to some of the nation's most important lands,
properties and resources be the subject of such intense debate? And, if changes were
5

49 U.S.C. § 303(c)(1,2).

6

See e.g., infra Part V.

7

See e.g., infra Part III.

8

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

9

See e.g., JERRY MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
AND MATERIALS (1992) at 708-718.

10

See infra Part V.
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to be made to § 4(f), what impacts would be created? What should the law be as to
the protection of environmental resources and historic properties when confronted
with the challenges of a growing population and an expanding highway and road
network designed to help accommodate this growing population? These are the
questions that have been asked, debated and discussed for nearly forty years. On the
eve of the first substantial change to § 4(f) via the transportation reauthorization bill11
that is currently winding its way through Congress, it is important to review these
questions and seek answers that might help guide the transportation and
environmental communities through the next forty years of § 4(f)'s existence.
This discussion seeks to provide those answers to these questions. Part II
begins with a review of the history of § 4(f), examining the past in order to illuminate
a future path or paths. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the judicial,
administrative and legislative interpretations of § 4(f). Part III focuses on the
differing interpretations taken by the Supreme Court and certain federal courts of
appeals. Part IV reviews actions and interpretations taken by the DOT, as well as
recent Bush administration actions concerning § 4(f). Following this line of inquiry,
the discussion next proceeds in Part V with an analysis of key legislative proposals of
the two most recent Congresses that have been offered in response to, or because of,
the complex and occasionally controversial history that enshrouds this section of the
11

See Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2004, S. 1072, 108th
Cong. (2003); Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, H.R. 3550, 108th Cong. (2003). These
bills provide for the multi-year authorization of federal highway and transit programs and projects.
They are also the main legislative vehicles for the reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for
the 21st Century (TEA-21), Pub. L. 105-178 (1998), the programs of which expired on September 30
2004. TEA-21 has been extended six times by Congress, and the current extension expires on May 31,
2004. See Surface Transportation Extension Act, Part V, H.R. 5183, 108th Cong. (2004). This
combined legislative process is commonly known as the transportation bill reauthorization and/or
TEA-21 reauthorization.
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law. Finally, the discussion concludes in Part VI with an examination of the
possibilities for the future of § 4(f).

II.

FROM WHERE WE STARTED -- THE HISTORY OF § 4(f)
What today is commonly known operationally and in practice as "§ 4(f)"12 is

the result of several evolutionary legislative developments. Section 4(f) "represented
the first major legislative victory, apart from water resource development programs,
in the battle of conservationists for control of pubic works projects."13 This victory,
however, was not absolute and not without its critics as the case law and subsequent
legislative developments discussed below will note.

A.

Federal- Aid Highway Act of 1966 -- "Consideration of Alternatives"
The opening move in the development of what has become known as § 4(f)

originated with an amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 196614 offered by
Senator Ralph Yarborough (D-TX).15 This amendment was offered largely in
response to a proposal by the Texas Department of Highways to build a road through
the Brackenridge Park in San Antonio and was an effort to place limitations on state

12

See e.g.,The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2003, Sectionby
- Section Analysis, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reauthorization/safetea__analysis.pdf (last
viewed Aug. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SAFETA DOT Analysis]. “Former § 4(f) was originally enacted as
part of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 and is now codified at 49 U.S.C. 303, but is still
commonly referred to as “§ 4(f)”. Id. at 26.
13

Oscar S. Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 32 MD. L. REV. 327 (1973).

14

This bill has been codified at 23 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2004). See also Pub. L. No. 89-574.

15

Id. at 333-34. Senator Yarborough served on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee. See
Biography of Senator Ralph Webster Yarborough, available at
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=Y000006 (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
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departments of transportation when building highways that required the taking of
parklands.16 This amendment ultimately was approved by the Senate and
incorporated with a modification into the final conference report for the Federal-Aid
Highways Act of 1966.17 The text of the provision as included in the conference
report is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the
provisions of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve
Federal, State, and local government parklands and historic sites and the
beauty and historic value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall
cooperate with the States in developing highway plans and programs which
carry out such policy. After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve
under § 105 of this title any program for a project which requires the use for
such project of any land from a Federal, State, or local government park or
historic site unless such program includes all possible planning, including
consideration of alternatives to the use of such land to minimize any harm to
such park or site resulting from such use.18
This final conference report language, now codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138,
incorporated one significant change from the original Yarborough amendment
approved by the Senate. Senator Yarborough's amendment originally included a
requirement that the Secretary of Transportation not approve any project using a
protected land unless there was no "feasible alternative to the use of such land."19 As
can be seen in the above conference report language, this language was deleted, and
language requiring a "consideration of alternatives" was added instead.20 Explanatory

16

Id.

17

Id. at 335. See also CONFERENCE REPORT ON FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1966, H. RPT. NO.
1903, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Conference Report]

18

Id. This language was subsequently codified at 23 U.S.C. § 138.

19

See Gray, supra note 13, at 334 citing 112 CONG. REC. 17448 (1966).

20

Id. at 335. See also 1966 Conference Report, supra note 17.
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conference report language specifically noted that "[t]he requirement that there be no
feasible alternative to the use of the land for highway purposes has been deleted and
there has been added the requirement that the planning must include consideration of
alternatives to the use of this land for highway purposes."21

B.

Department of Transportation Act of 1966 -- "Feasible and Prudent
Alternatives"
Concurrent with congressional consideration and passage of the Federal-Aid

Highway Act of 1966, Congress also considered legislation to create and establish the
DOT.22 This legislation consolidated, for the first time, the major transportation
modal administrations and agencies responsible for aviation, highways, railroads,
motor carrier safety, the Coast Guard, and the Saint Lawrence Seaway.23 In creating
this new cabinet-level department, Congress sought to not only establish the formal
structures that would govern the day-to-day operations of the department and its new
constituent administrations, but also to outline broad principles that would apply to
the entire DOT.24

21

1966 Conference Report, supra note 17, at 11-12.

22

Gray, supra note 13, at 334-35. See Department of Transportation Act of Oct. 25, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-670, 80 Stat. 931. (1966).

23

Gray, supra note 13, at 329

24

Id. at 328-329. The modal agencies created by the Department of Transportation Act of 1966
included the following: the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and
the Federal Highway Administration. "Other organizations transferred to DOT included the Coast
Guard, from Treasury; the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), from Commerce to the new FHWA; and the
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation." Id. at 329.
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Among the general principles that Congress added to the DOT Act of 1966
were two sections--§§ 2(a) and (b)(2), Declaration of Purpose and § 4(f).25 These two
provisions, along with the Yarborough Amendment described above, were later to
become what is now commonly known within the transportation and environmental
law practice areas as "§ 4(f)."26 Section 2(a) of the DOT Act of 1966 states the
following:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare, the economic growth
and stability of the Nation and its security require the development of national
transportation policies and programs conducive to the provision of fast, safe,
efficient, and convenient transportation at the lowest cost consistent therewith
and with other national objectives, including the efficient utilization and
conservation of the Nation's resources (emphasis added).27
§ 2(b)(2) notes the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special efforts should be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.28
The Senate Committee on Government Operations, one of the committees
charged with creating the DOT, also issued a committee report to accompany S. 3010,
the Senate's bill to establish the DOT. In this report, the committee noted that § 4(f)
and the policy statements in § 2 "are designed to insure that in planning highways,
railroad rights-of-way, airports and other transportation facilities, care will be taken,
to the maximum extent possible, not to interfere with or disturb established

25

See CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1966, H. RPT. NO.
2236, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter DOT Act Conference Report]
26

See e.g., SHERRY HUTT ET. AL., CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE
MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION, AND PRESERVATION OF HERITAGE RESOURCES at 15 (2004).
27

DOT Act Conference Report, supra note 25, at § 2(a).

28

Id. at § 2(b)(2).
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recreational facilities and refuges."29 This statement by using the language "to the
maximum extent possible" implies that the Secretary, while being directed to apply a
rigorous approach when evaluating § 4(f) protected lands, is also allowed to temper
that approach with pragmatism i.e., he or she must protect the lands but in doing so
must only approve an approach that is "possible" or workable.

1.

Conference Report Language -- § 4(f)

The conference report for the DOT Act goes on to describe other broad
guiding principles for DOT. In § 4, several general provisions are articulated that
apply to DOT and are not specific to any one modal administration.30 Among these
general provisions is § 4(f) that, as enacted as part of the DOT Act of 1966, stated the
following:
The Secretary shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior,
Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States in
developing transportation plans and programs that includes measures to
maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the
effective date of this Act, the Secretary shall not approve any program or
project which requires the use of any land from a public park, recreation area,
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site unless (1) there is no feasible
and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes
all possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area,
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use.31
This conference report language was the result of the conferees adopting a substitute
amendment that made minor, but significant, changes to the original Senate language

29

S. REP. NO. 1659, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1966).

30

DOT Act Conference Report, supra note 25, at § 4(f).

31

Id. This language has been subsequently codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2004).
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of S. 3010 as amended.32 Most notable of these changes was the addition of the
words "and prudent" after "feasible."33 The impact of these additions will be
explored in more detail below.

2.

Conference Report Debate -- § 4(f)

During the House's floor consideration of the conference report, there was
discussion by some Members of Congress who raised concerns about the scope and
reach of § 4(f). Congressman Kluczynski (D-IL) noted that while he generally
supported the bill, he "sound[ed] a word of caution in interpreting § 4(f)."34 He
argued that the "protection of our parks, open spaces, historic sites, fish and game
habitats, and the other natural resources with which our Nation is so richly endowed
is of the utmost importance and urgency, but not to the total exclusion of other
considerations."35 In fact, to provide disproportionate protections to these "protected"
resources "would result in as many inequities as justifying transportation plans merely
on the basis of economy or efficiency."36 He continued his observations by
identifying some of the "other considerations" that should be taken into account when
reviewing the efficacy of a particular transportation project. These other
considerations "would include the integrity of neighborhoods, the displacement of

32

Id. "The conference substitute amendment adopts the Senate amendment language except for adding
the words "and prudent" after the word "feasible." Id.
33

Id.

34

112 CONG. REC. 26651 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1966) (statement of Rep. Kluczynski on the DOT Act
Conference Report).
35

Id.

36

Id.
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people and businesses, and the protection of schools, and churches and the myriad of
other social and human values we find in our communities."37 As will be noted in
more detail below, these "other considerations" have formed the basis of many
present-day concerns regarding the application of this section. Congressman
Kluczynski, in fact, anticipated many of the issues that have arisen in litigation and in
policy debates since the passage of this provision.
Also joining Congressman Kluczynski in his concerns about § 4(f) was his
fellow Illinois congressional delegation colleague, Congressman Rostenkowski, who
would later go on to lead the influential House Ways and Means Committee. Mr.
Rostenkowski, while supportive of the inclusion of § 4(f) in the bill, reiterated
concerns that were originally raised during debate on the Yarborough Amendment to
the Federal Highway Act.38 "Fear was expressed," Congressman Rostenkowski
noted, "that the [Yarborough] amendment might be misinterpreted to mean the
preservation of natural and manmade resources would be the overriding consideration
in highway construction."39 Rostenkowski made clear that his support for this
provision was contingent upon the inclusion of guidelines that required the Secretary
of Transportation to consider the feasibility and prudence of alternatives to use
protected lands and also to use "all possible planning to minimize harm" to the lands
protected by the section. These guidelines provide both protection to the lands
37

Id. Congressman Kluczynski ultimately did support the bill because he believed the planning
requirements and insertion of the word "prudent" as a modifier for the types of alternatives that must
be considered made § 4(f) "workable and effective." Nevertheless, the "word of caution" that he raised
regarding this section remains valid particularly as it relates to the "other considerations" he believed
must be accounted for when conducting an analysis under this section.

38

Id.

39

Id.
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identified in the section and also give the Secretary a measure of discretion in his or
her review process. This measure of discretion was important to Congressman
Rostenkowski, and he specifically noted that he wanted "the Record to show… that it
is not the intent of Congress to tie the Secretary's hands."40 Congressman
Rostenkowski's statements, along with those of Congressman Kluczynski, provide a
key foundation for the interpretation of § 4 (f).
In order to further illustrate his concerns, Congressman Rostenkowski offered
up several examples of situations in which the application of § 4(f) to real-life
situations might prove problematic.41 He envisioned situations where the Secretary
might have to "choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or saving human lives by
a highway improvement" or choose "between using public parkland or displacing
hundreds of families.42 Therefore, to ensure that these types of Hobbesian choices
could be avoided to the maximum extent possible, Congressman Rostenkowksi
argued that "[Congress] should memorialize the Secretary to give full consideration to
the preservation of public lands, but not at the expense of human lives and human
welfare."43 With these concerns articulated, Congressman Rostenkowski offered his
support for the provision and the conference report, believing that the language would
adequately address his concerns.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 26651-52.

43

Id. at 256652.

15

C.

Federal- Aid Highway Act of 1968
After passage and enactment of both the Yarborough Amendment to the

Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966 and § 4(f) of the DOT Act of 1966, it quickly
became apparent that the slight variation between the two provisions--one applying
only to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (the Yarborough Amendment)
and the other applying to the entire DOT, including the FHWA as well as other modal
agencies (§ 4(f))--created confusion with state and local governments and in the
transportation community.44 The language of the Yarborough Amendment as
codified did not include the "feasible and prudent alternatives" analysis required
under § 4(f). As a result of this discrepancy and the cloud it cast over transportation
projects, Congress revisited this issue in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968.45
Initially, the House and Senate Public Works Committees46 proposed to
correct this discrepancy by "chang[ing] § 4(f) to read more like § 138."47 This
proposal was met with opposition by the environmental and preservationist
communities48 and necessitated a different approach by the conference committee in
order to find an acceptable solution. The result was that "both § 4(f) of the DOT Act
44

§ 4(f) Policy Paper, Federal Highway Administration (September 24, 1987, revised June 7, 1989),
available at http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/projdev/4fpolicy.htm [hereinafter 4(f) Policy Paper]. See
also Gray, supra note 13, at 338.

45

Gray, supra note 13, at 338.

46

At the time, these two committees were the committees of authorizing jurisdiction. Today, the
committees of primary jurisdiction over the FHWA and the DOT are the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee and the
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.

47

Gray, supra note 13, at 339.

48

Gray, supra note 13, at 339. The environmental community was concerned that eliminating the
"feasible and prudent alternatives" requirement in favor of a mere "consideration of alternatives"
would water down the overall provision and result in more loss of protected lands.
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and § 138 were amended so as to be identical to each other."49 The resulting
conference language as codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) is the following:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The
Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of
the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the
States in developing transportation plans and programs that include measures
to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of the lands traversed. After the
effective date of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not
approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned
land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of
national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or
local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any land from an historic site of
national, State, or local significance as so determined by such officials unless
(1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2)
such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park,
recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from
such use.50
Essentially, the new language used § 4(f) as the base text and added a few new
provisions.51 First, § 2(b) of the DOT Act of 1966 was incorporated into the
beginning as a statement of national policy. Second, the words "publicly owned"
were inserted as a modifier for "land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife
and waterfowl refuge."52 Finally, the lands protected by the section were to be of
"national, State or local significance as determined by the Federal, State or local

49

Gray, supra note 13, at 339-340.

50

49 U.S.C. § 1653(f).

51

Gray, supra note 13, at 340.

52

Note that the modifier "publicly owned" does not apply to historic sites. See Gray, supra note 13 at
340.
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officials."53 These changes ensured that the "feasible and prudent alternatives"
language remained in effect--an issue of importance to the environmental community.
A review of the committee reports accompanying this legislation also reveals
Congressional concern over the scope and application of § 4(f). House Report No.
1799 noted the following:
This amendment of both relevant sections of law is intended to make it
unmistakably clear that neither section constitutes a mandatory prohibition
against the use of enumerated lands; but rather, is a discretionary authority
which must be used with both wisdom and reason. The Congress does not
believe, for example, that substantial numbers of people should be required to
move in order to preserve these lands, or that clearly enunciated a local
preference should be overturned on the basis of this authority.54
This clearly indicates that Congress did not necessarily intend that § 4(f) be strictly
and stringently interpreted. In fact, the legislative history indicates a strong
inclination for local decision-making. The legislative history also notes that § 4(f)
should be applied with "wisdom and reason." As will be seen in the discussion
below, this issue has been a source of contention and disagreement among some of
the circuit courts of appeal.

D.

Recodification of the DOT Act of 1983 and Amendment of 1987
Section 4(f) remained unchanged until, as part of an "overall recodification of

the DOT Act, § 4(f) was amended and codified in 49 U.S.C. § 303."55 This version of
4(f) remains in effect today with only one minor change occurring since this
53

See Gray, supra note 13 at 340.

54

H. Rep. No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 3531,
3538.

55

4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 3.
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recodification56. The language of § 4(f) currently in effect is codified at 49 U.S.C. §
303:
(a)
It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort be
made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(b)
The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the
Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture,
and with the States, in developing transportation plans and programs that
include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of lands crossed
by transportation activities or facilities.
(c)
The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project
requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation areas or
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or land of an historic site of national, State, or
local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials
having jurisdiction over the park, recreation areas refuge, or site) only if,
(1)
there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land;
and
(2)
the program or project includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl
refuges or historic site resulting from the use.57
As can be seen upon comparison of the above language with the earlier
versions, no substantial changes were made to § 4(f). In addition, as the FHWA
noted, "[t]he legislative history of the 1983 recodification indicates that no
substantive change was intended" to § 4(f).58 Moreover, "because of familiarity with
§ 4(f) by thousands of Federal and state personnel, the Federal Highway
Administration continues to refer to the requirements as § 4(f)".59 Unfortunately, "§

56

The only additional change made to § 4(f) since the 1983 recodification was a 1987 amendment.
This amendment inserted in subsection (c) after "requiring the use" the following language: "(other
than any project for a road or parkway under § 204 of title 23)". See 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2004); See also
Pub. L. No. 100-17, Title I, § 133(d), 101 Stat. 173.

57

49 U.S.C. § 303.

58

4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 4.

59

Id.

19

138 was not amended, so the wording in the two sections is once again different."60
Nevertheless, 49 U.S.C. § 303 as recodified in 1983 and slightly modified in 1987
represents the current statutory treatment of § 4(f), and it is this current form that has
been the subject of ongoing debate within the transportation and environmental
communities.

III.

EXPLORING THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS – A SPLIT
AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Since its inception, § 4(f) has been the subject of debate and differing opinions

as to its meaning and scope.61 In fact, "[n]ext to the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), § 4(f) has been the most frequently litigated environmental statute in the
Federal Highway program."62 It has also been "the most frequent cause of court
injunctions halting highway programs."63 These many cases have helped define the
landscape of § 4(f), and as will be seen in the discussion below, some facets of the
section have been interpreted differently in certain circuits. The discussion below
focuses, first, on the seminal § 4(f) Supreme Court case--Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe64--and then turns to key, representative cases from several different
U.S. Courts of Appeal that highlight the competing views on the scope and
application of § 4 (f) taken by some circuits. As will be seen, these differing
60

Id.
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See e.g., 4(f) Policy Paper, supra note 44, at 4.
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§ 4(F) - INTRODUCTION: LEGAL OVERVIEW (2004), available at
http://www.§4f.com/case_studies.htm (last visited June 11, 2004) (overview of § 4(f) legal issues).
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Id.
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Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 402.
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viewpoints tend to fall primarily into one of two camps: (1) a more flexible, balanced
approach; and (2) a more stringent and strict approach.

A.

U.S. Supreme Court -- Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe
Interestingly enough--despite the large volume of litigation involving § 4(f)--

only one case concerning § 4(f) has been litigated before the Supreme Court.65 This
case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,66 involved the review of a proposed
highway project in Memphis, Tennessee.67
The plaintiffs/petitioners--a group of private citizens allied to stop the use of
Overton Park for a highway--challenged the Secretary of Transportation's approval of
a planned highway project that was to be routed through the park.68 The citizens'
group argued that the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) did not properly meet
his obligations under § 4(f). First, they alleged the Secretary did not produce a formal
finding documenting his decision, thus making it difficult for the court to analyze and
review the Secretary's decision.69 Second, alternative routes that would not impact
the park existed and these alternatives were both "feasible and prudent."70 Third, and
finally, the citizens argued that even if those alternatives were deemed not "feasible
and prudent," "all possible" methods were not taken to minimize the highway's harm
65

Id.

66

Id..

67

Id. at 406.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 408.

70

Id.
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to the park.71 The Secretary argued that his approval of the project was based upon
the fact that the route through the park was authorized by the Bureau of Public Roads
in 1956 and also approved by local officials.72 Affidavits attesting to the rationale of
the Secretary in making his decision as well as indicating the independence with
which he exercised his project approval discretion were introduced at the district
court.73
Both the district court and the court of appeals ruled in favor of the Secretary
and noted in their decisions that the Secretary did not need to make formal findings
when approving the project and that his authority and discretion was broad.74 The
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Marshall and joined by five of his
brethren,75 reversed the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.76 The
Court noted that while formal findings on the part of the Secretary were not required,
additional evidence beyond that provided for in the affidavits was needed to support
the Secretary's decision.77 Therefore, the case was remanded to the district court for
further investigation as to the Secretary's rationale in approving the project and his
decision-making process.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 406.
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Id. at 409. Opposing and contradicting affidavits were also filed by the citizens group.
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Id. at 409.

75

Id. at 403. Justice Marshall was joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan,
Stewart, White and Blackmun.
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Id. at 406.
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Id. at 409.
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Overton Park, however, is notable in § 4(f) practice and lore for the
statements made in the opinion's dicta.78 It is these statements that have attributed
much to the interpretation of § 4(f) and have also been the subject of discussion in
some of the more recent federal decisions concerning § 4(f). Chief among the issues
raised in Overton Park's dicta is the Court's statement that the Secretary may not
approve a project that would result in "destruction of parkland" unless the alternative
to using the parkland would itself pose "unique problems."79
The Court elaborates on what constitutes a "unique" problem. Factors
regarding the alternatives to using parkland or other protected lands such as "cost,
directness of route, and community disruption" are not considered to be unique
according to the Court.80 These types of factors were already taken into account
when § 4(f) was enacted because "if Congress [had] intended these factors to be on an
equal footing with the preservation of parkland there would have been no need for [§
4(f)]."81 In taking this position, the Court rejected the Secretary's contention that he
should be able to "engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests."82
And, as will be seen below, some circuits have backed away from this outright
rejection of a balancing test as it applies to determining whether no "feasible and

78

In addition, the case is noteworthy in the administrative law field. See e.g., Mashaw, supra note 9, at
708-718.
79

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413.
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Id. at 411.
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Id. at 412.
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Id.
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prudent" alternative exists to the use of protected lands.83 Others circuits, however,
have followed closely the dicta in Overton Park and required a clear showing that a
"unique problem" with an alternative route justifies encroachment on a park or other
protected land.84

B.

Flexibility and Balance -- 7th, 4th and D.C. Circuits
The late 1960's and the 1970's represented a time of peak expansion of the

interstate highway system.85 It was a time when new roads and highways were being
built in large numbers and a time when many were concerned that parks and historic
areas would be lost or destroyed to the advance of the bulldozer and road builders.86
It was precisely for these reasons and to address these concerns that § 4(f) was
enacted.87 However, as "[t]oday's highway program is oriented much more toward
system preservation and modernization" rather than to system expansion, the "rigid
rules for applying § 4(f)" are often out of step with real world practices.88 Several
circuit courts have reflected this notion in their decisions and have moved the § 4(f)
jurisprudence away from the strict constructionist view espoused by Overton Park.

83

See e.g., Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987); Hickory Neighborhood Defense
League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1990).

84

See e.g., La. Envtl. Soc’y v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1976); Druid Hills Civic Assoc. v.
FHWA, 772 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985); Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Brinegar, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984).

85

See e.g., FHWA History, supra note 3, at 10-13.
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The following discussion analyzes several key and representative cases that have
favored a more flexible and balanced interpretation and application of § 4(f).

1.

Eagle Foundation v. Dole -- 7th Circuit

One of the seminal cases that helped define a newer approach to interpreting §
4(f) is Eagle Foundation v. Dole.89 This case involved a challenge to a planned fourlane highway to connect Decatur, Springfield and Jacksonville, Illinois with
Hannibal, Missouri.90 This connection necessitated constructing a bridge to cross the
Illinois River.91 The plans for the bridge were controversial because its construction
impacted both the Pike County Conservation Area,92 parts of which serve as winter
roosting spots for the bald eagle, as well as the Wade Farm, an historic farm dating to
the 1840’s that was also eligible for inclusion in the National Register for Historic
Places.93
Due to the potential impacts that this transportation project posed to both a
wildlife refuge and an historic place, § 4(f) was necessarily implicated. The
plaintiffs/appellants--Eagle Foundation, Inc.94--"sought to block construction of the
highway on the ground that… § 4(f) prohibited the construction as a substantive
89

Eagle Found. v. Dole, 813 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987).
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Id. at 800.
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Id.
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"… the 862-acre Pike County Conservation Area (PCCA), which includes Napolean Hallow, was
established to preserve wildlife, some to be watched and some to be hunted." Id. at 800.
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Id.
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Eagle Foundation, in addition to having an interest in any development in the PCCA that might
disrupt the habitat of the bald eagles known to inhabit the area, also had a leasehold interest in the
Wade Farm. Id. at 801.
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manner."95 The trial court held that the "Secretary [of Transportation] did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that… no other placement of the bridge
across the Illinois River is 'feasible and prudent.'"96 In addition, the trial court also
held that the plans for the highway "minimize[d] the harm" to the protected
property.97 Thus, the Secretary was found to be in compliance with both prongs of §
4(f), and the court allowed the project to proceed even though it impacted § 4(f)protected property because no other "feasible and prudent" alternative existed and any
harms to the protected lands were minimized. Eagle Foundation, subsequently
appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Writing the opinion for the three judge panel, Judge Easterbrook upheld the
district court's decision and provided a new interpretation of the views espoused in
Overton Park. Easterbrook argued that the Secretary of Transportation should be
given a fair amount of latitude in applying and interpreting the § 4(f) requirements.98
More significantly, the decision in Eagle Foundation established the notion that the
Secretary, in carrying out his or her responsibilities pursuant to § 4(f), should balance
competing interests in determining what is "feasible and prudent."99 This is a clear
departure from the rigid interpretations voiced in Overton Park.100
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Id.

96

Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 804. "The statutory standard makes deferential review inevitable." Id.
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Id.

100

Cf. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411. "… no such wide-ranging endeavor [referencing the Secretary's
assertion that he be allowed to 'engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests'] was
intended [by Congress]" Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 798.
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However, Eagle Foundation did not stop with the statement that the Secretary
be allowed to engage in a balancing test to determine whether or not a project should
be advanced given the § 4(f) requirements. In fact, it went further--directly taking
issue with the Supreme Court's use of the word "unique" to describe those types of
problems that are required to be proven in order to warrant or justify using a protected
land for a highway project. Essentially, the Eagle Foundation court argued that if the
Supreme Court really meant what it said regarding "unique" problems being required
to be shown to justify the taking of a protected land for a highway project then there
would be virtually no such situation in reality that would fit this description because
these type of problems and situations are almost never unique, i.e., almost never "one
of a kind."101 A review, according to the court, of the legislative intent of § 4(f),
argues against "such an extreme position."102
The courtgoes on to state that "we cannot believe… the Supreme Court meant
that if a risk or cost has been accepted, or an obstacle overcome, for any highway in
the United States, then it always must be accepted or overcome in preference to the
use of any § 4(f) lands…"103 Indeed, all that is necessary for the Secretary to
overcome the presumption against using § 4(f) lands is a "good," and prudent
reason.104 Once "the Secretary makes that hard decision, it must be respected."105

101

Id. In discussing the Supreme Court's requirement that a problem be "unique" in order to allow a
highway project to take protected land, the court observed that "'[u]nique'" is a word without degree; a
situation is unique (nonpareil, one of a kind) or it is not." Id.
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While this interpretation of the requirements of § 4(f) clearly redefines and
reframes the scope and depth of § 4(f) review by both the Secretary and the courts,
Eagle Foundation provides yet a further redefinition. In conducting a § 4(f) review
and inquiry, the Secretary may take into account "everything important that
matters."106 Thus, a Secretary may approve a project even though it requires the
taking and/or use of § 4(f) protected lands if "[a] cumulation of small problems" so
warrants such action.107 This reasoning would likely not withstand the rigid
construction articulated by the Overton Park Court. However, "aggregate injuries," if
sufficient, may even meet the threshold test of uniqueness as espoused by Overton
Park.108 In Eagle Foundation, the court cited a "two-volume study" as evidence of an
accumulation of problems that justified routing the highway through otherwise
protected lands.109 This new gloss on Overton Park substantially enlarged the
discretion of the Secretary when conducting a § 4(f) review. No longer would the
Secretary be confined to a consideration of only large, "unique" problems when
reviewing the efficacy of a highway project; now, "[e]ven a featherweight drawback
may play some role."110
Related to the issue of considering aggregate problems and injuries is the issue
of how searching should a § 4(f) review and inquiry be in terms of looking at these
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Id.
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Id. The court also cited Town of Fenton v. Dole, 636 F.Supp. 557, 567 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 792 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1986), to support this "cumulation" argument.
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alternatives and potential problems.111 This is an issue that continues to vex highway
and transportation planners and can often drive project costs up as reviews try to be
all encompassing .112 Rather than have the highway planners continue to "look at a
few more" options, the court argued that the proper inquiry is "whether enough have
been examined to permit a sound judgment that the study of additional variations is
not worthwhile."113 In the instant case, the court found that DOT "examined more
than ten routes"114 within a "ten by six mile area."115 The court deemed this level and
scope of review and analysis by the Secretary as sufficient.116
Finally, the court considered the issue of whether or not the Secretary
approved a plan that minimized the harms to the § 4(f) protected lands.117 As with its
finding regarding the scope of review for alternatives, the court also found the
Secretary took sufficient steps in approving a plan that would "minimize the harms"
to the protected lands.118 The court also noted that the requirement to "minimize the
harms" should be viewed in the context of a broader "national interest" in protecting §
4(f) protected lands.119 Therefore, taking and using a small amount of protected lands
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Id. at 807.
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See infra, Part V.A.1
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Eagle Found., 813 F.2d at 807.
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may be justified if the alternative might mean "more total damage" to other protected
lands.120
Eagle Foundation represented another piece in the increasingly fractured
picture of what § 4(f) means in both the legal and the practical settings. The case, a
victory for highway and transportation advocates, further widened the gap between
the circuits over how to interpret § 4(f), as well as how to apply the principles of
Overton Park. Indeed, for the first time since Overton Park, a U.S. Court of Appeals
set forth a significant, new interpretation of Overton Park. Now, for projects in the
Midwestern states of the Seventh Circuit (Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin), the
Secretary of Transportation was provided with a broader discretion when exercising
his or her judgment on transportation projects. The Secretary could now do the
following: balance competing interests when determining whether or not an
alternative might be “feasible and prudent”; consider an accumulation of problems in
making the same determination; and take into account a broader national interest
when signing off on steps to minimize harms to protected lands, the use or taking of
which may be required to advance a transportation project. This interpretation altered
the landscape surrounding § 4(f), and as will be seen below it caused other circuit
courts to follow its lead.

2.

Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner -- 4th Circuit

Three years after Eagle Foundation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
joined with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of § 4(f). In Hickory Neighborhood

120

Id.

30

Defense League v. Skinner,121 the court considered a challenge to the Secretary of
Transportation's approval of a highway widening project part of which required using
property in an historic district.122 The plaintiff-appellant, the Hickory Neighborhood
Defense League, sought to enjoin this project on the grounds that the Secretary did
not adhere to his responsibilities under § 4(f).123 The district court rejected this
challenge and found that the Secretary had complied with § 4(f).124 This decision was
appealed and the Fourth Circuit in Hickory Neighborhood I125, remanded the case
back to the district court for additional review on the question of whether "the
Secretary determined that the alternatives to the widening of N.C. Highway 127 were
not prudent in light of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe."126 Upon
remand, the district court, again, found that the Secretary acted appropriately under §
4(f), and this decision was, again, appealed.127
In considering this second appeal, the Fourth Circuit followed the views
espoused in Eagle Foundation and found that the Secretary had properly exercised his
discretion under § 4(f). In reaching this decision, the court noted that the touchstone
words used by the Supreme Court in Overton Park, namely the use of "unique" and
"extraordinary" in describing those problems that justified approval of a project
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requiring the use of § 4(f) protected lands, were not to be substituted for the statutory
term "prudent."128 Thus, the Secretary need not "expressly indicate a finding of
unique problems" as long as the "record amply supports [his or her] conclusion that…
there were compelling reasons for rejecting the proposed alternatives as not
prudent."129
The Hickory Neighborhood court also affirmed the "cumulation of problems"
rationale as an independent or additional basis that a Secretary may cite in approving
a project under § 4(f).130 Again, this holding both affirms the reasoning articulated in
Eagle Foundation and represents a further distancing from the standards set forth in
Overton Park. It also further highlighted a growing split among the circuits as to how
strictly § 4(f) should be interpreted and applied. By the time of Hickory
Neighborhood, nearly 20 years had passed since Overton Park and in that time span
numerous 4(f) cases had been litigated, with some courts such as those in Eagle
Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood taking a more balanced, more protransportation view on § 4(f), while other courts, as the discussion below will
indicate, adopted a more strict, more pro-environment and historic preservation
viewpoint regarding § 4(f). The debate and the split continues.

3.

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey -- D.C. Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has addressed
numerous § 4(f) issues over the years. In Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey,
128

Id. at 162-63 citing Eagle Found. 813 F.2d 798, 804-05 (7th Cir 1987).
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Hickory Neighborhood, 910 F.2d at 163 (4th Cir. 1990).

130

Id. See also discussion, supra at Part III.B.2.
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the court reviewed a § 4(f) challenge to an airport expansion project in Toledo, Ohio
alleging that noise impacts to the Oak Openings Preserve Metropark would be caused
by the airport expansion.131 The plaintiffs-appellants, a citizens' group formed in
opposition to the project at issue, argued the expansion would "constructively 'use'" a
campground in the Metropark by "subject[ing] the camp to nighttime noise of up to
Ldn 75 decibels."132 This argument was rejected by the district court, and Citizens
Against Burlington appealed to the D.C. Circuit.133
In considering this constructive use argument, the court turned to Overton
Park for guidance. Making a point to highlight the deferential standard of review that
must be accorded to agency decision-makers under Overton Park, the court noted that
if an agency's "decision was reasonable [then]… we are not entitled to displace its
decision with our own or with anyone else's."134 The key word, here, is "reasonable."
The D.C. Circuit cited the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) findings as well
as those of the district court and upheld the agency findings as appropriate and not in
violation of § 4(f).135 Thus, the court implicitly stated that it is "reasonable" for the
FAA to conclude that the only alternative presented to the airport expansion was to
expand an airport in Fort Wayne, Indiana and that alternative would be contrary to the
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Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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goals of this transportation project--"providing the Toledo area with a modern,
effective cargo hub."136
The significance of this case with respect to § 4(f) jurisprudence is the court's
restatement of the Overton Park deferential standard of review for agency decisions.
This standard can, at times, be lost as courts wade into the intricacies of § 4(f) and
literally fail to see the forest through the trees. Courts in § 4(f) cases are often called
upon to interject their opinion or their own analysis as to which alignment or which
alternative should be approved. Citizens Against Burlington stands as a reminder that
"federal courts are neither empowered nor competent to micromanage strategies for
saving the nation's parklands."137 Rather, the federal agencies should be given
deference by courts in reviewing their actions as the agencies are better equipped to
apply laws such as § 4(f).

4.

Sierra Club v. Dole -- D.C. Circuit

In the case of Sierra Club v. Dole138, the D.C. Circuit evaluated a challenge to
a plan to allow Boeing 737 jet airplanes to operate out of Jackson Hole Airport in
Wyoming. One of the key issues this case examines is the threshold line that must be
crossed in order for a use of protected lands to be deemed prohibited under § 4(f).139
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Id. at 204.
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Id. at 205. This statement was made specifically in response to a request by the Citizens Against
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deferential to the decisions of the agencies. The court argued strongly that "Congress wanted the
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139

See id. at 129.

34

How significant must the use of protected lands be to trigger the requirements of §
4(f)? Since propeller planes were already operating out of the airport--and had been
for over forty-five years--the case turned on whether or not the additional noise from
the jet airplanes amounted to a "constructive use" of the nearby Grand Teton National
Park. 140
The court held that the additional noise did not constitute a use under § 4(f).141
Citing legislative history, the court noted that "Congress gave no indication that [§
4(f)] was intended to create ongoing review of relatively minor changes in the
operational characteristics of an established transportation facility." In effect, the
court recognized that certain exceptions might apply to § 4(f) and allowed for a
degree of flexibility in how § 4(f) is administered. As the court noted, "[i]t can hardly
be expected, once an airport has been in operation, that every change in flight
scheduling or operations must be accompanied" by a § 4(f) evaluation. This approach
makes common sense and any "contrary view of the statute would produce a blizzard
of useless [§ 4(f)] statements."142 If Sierra Club v. Dole represents one end of the §
4(f) spectrum, there is an equal and opposite end as the following discussion will
explore.
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C.

Strict Interpretation -- 5th, 9th and 11th Circuits
While some circuits were busy putting their own different interpretations on

Overton Park, other circuits were content not to stray from the Overton Park line of
reasoning. These latter circuits chose a path supported by many in the environmental
and historic preservation communities that seek to have a high bar established for any
transportation project requiring the use of § 4(f) protected lands. The following
discussion examines this path and the key cases from those circuits that have pursued
such a course.

1.

Louisiana Environmental Society v. Coleman – 5th Circuit

In one of the earlier cases litigated after Overton Park, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered a case in Louisiana involving the construction of a highway
project through a recreational area known as Cross Lake.143 In Louisiana
Environmental Society v. Coleman, the plaintiff-appellant, Louisiana Environmental
Society (LES), challenged the approval of a project by the Secretary as not being
consistent with the criteria of § 4(f) and that the Secretary's findings were not
supported by fact.144 The district court denied this challenge and refused to issue a
permanent injunction against the project setting up an appeal by LES and the
subsequent decision by the Fifth Circuit.145
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See La. Envtl. Soc’y, Inc. v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 81 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Using the guideposts provided by Overton Park, the court considered three
main questions that must be answered when reviewing a case under § 4(f).146 First,
"[c]ould [the Secretary] have reasonably believed that there was no substantial taking
[of a recreational area]?"147 Second, "[c]ould the Secretary have reasonably
believed… that there were truly unusual factors?"148 And, third, "[c]ould [the
Secretary] have reasonably believed that the alternate routes presented unique
problems?"149 As the court indicated, "an affirmative answer to any [of these
questions] would require dismissing the plaintiffs' attack on the Secretary's § 4(f)
determination."150
These questions track closely to the analysis put forth in Overton Park and
stand in contrast to the decisions in Eagle Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood that
were to come some ten years or more later.151 The court, in this case, was not yet
ready to move away from the strict § 4 (f) interpretation established by Overton Park.
In fact, it even added some additional gloss of its own. The Fifth Circuit noted that
"the spirit of Overton Park is clearly to the effect that the statute is to be read broadly
to protect greenlands."152 Therefore, the court argued that even a minimal taking of
protected lands for the purposes of advancing a transportation project is sufficient to
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trigger the requirements of § 4(f).153 Any other interpretation of the requirements of §
4(f) would "permit an initial appraisal of whether the use was substantial, [and]…
would infuse consideration of elements (such as the degree of harm to the park,
animal life, environment, etc.) which Congress did not want considered when it said,
if there is another way take it."154 This interpretation, again, contrasts sharply with
the balancing approach offered by Eagle Foundation and its progeny.
In examining if "unusual factors" might warrant the use of §4(f) protected
lands, the court delineated several points of analysis to guide DOT's § 4(f) review
process. Most notably, the court stated that "§ 4(f)(1) requires that each 'alternative to
the use' of the parkland must be found to be either infeasible or imprudent before the
Secretary can approve the use of parkland."155 In addition, "[a]n alternate route which
uses any part of park is not an alternative to use of the park."156 Thus, in this case,
the court held that the Secretary's review of the alternatives was incomplete and "did
not make the requisite testing of the various routes to determine how to keep harm to
the lake to a minimum."157 These additional analytical requirements expanded the
alternative review process that the Secretary must undertake pursuant to § 4(f) and,
again, raised the bar to project development and construction requiring the use of
parkland.
153
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On the issue of what constitutes a "unique" problem that would justify the
taking or use of a § 4(f) protected land, the Fifth Circuit added to the Overton Park
definition by noting that a long time delay is not a "unique" problem.158 This is a
substantial enlargement of the Overton Park definition because in this particular case
the lower court had found that proceeding with an alternative route that did not use a
protected land would add ten additional years to the project.159 Even a delay as
substantial as a decade was insufficient to rise to the status of "unique." The court
observed that "[i]f time is the penalty, it cannot be turned into an exception which
justifies noncompliance."160
Overall, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Louisiana Environmental Society both
affirms and expands Overton Park. It rejects the notion that a protected property
taking must be "substantial" in order to activate § 4(f) requirements. The decision
denies the use of a balancing test that may justify building a project even though it
uses or takes a § 4(f) protected land. It also simultaneously expands the alternatives
analysis review to ensure that no alternatives are considered that even minimally
require the use of a protected land. Finally, the court's opinion dismisses the
argument that a lengthy delay--even one as long as a decade--constitutes a "unique"
problem--the presence of which would allow the project to go forward even if it used
protected property.
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2.

Stop H-3 Association v. Dole -- 9th Circuit

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Stop H-3 Association v. Dole161 took
its turn at tackling § 4(f) issues, and like the court in Louisiana Environmental
Society, it too affirmed Overton Park and also offered its own additional views on the
scope of § 4(f). Stop H-3 involved a § 4(f) challenge by three environmental and
community groups162 to a planned Interstate highway project that required the taking
and use of land from "two public parklands: (1) Ho'omaluhia Park, a major regional
park; and (2) Pali Golf Course Park, one of Oahu's most challenging and heavily used
public golf courses."163 After having their challenges turned aside by the district
court, the groups appealed to the Ninth Circuit.164
Following Overton Park, the court ultimately reversed the district court's
affirmation of the Secretary's decision to approve the H-3 highway project and
remanded the case for further proceedings.165 The court noted that "the requirements
of § 4(f) are stringent."166 It also reaffirmed the views of Overton Park regarding
"unique problems." Specifically, the court noted that the dislocation of a church, four
businesses, thirty-one residences, increased noise, air and visual pollution, and higher
costs were all insufficient to rise to the standard of "unique" problems requiring the
161
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approval of an alignment that would prevent such problems i.e., an alignment using
parklands.167 In addition, the court declined to rule on a "totality of circumstances"
theory argued at the trial court as justification for approving the alignment requiring
the use of parklands because "even when amalgamated [the reasons] do not satisfy the
Overton Park standards."168
While Stop H-3 is important for its affirmation of Overton Park, it is also
important for its commentary on two additional issues that often arise in § 4(f)
litigation: (1) how to weigh safety issues in the context of "unique" problems169 and
(2) how to review "no build" alternatives.170 The court's observations on these issues,
again, raised the "stringent" Overton Park standards. And, according to some, they
have substantially interfered with the "cooperative federalism" model that governs
modern transportation project construction.171
On the issue of safety considerations, the court stated that "since they so
directly involve human life, warrant extremely close scrutiny when determining
whether such considerations satisfy the Overton Park standards."172 While "[n]either
a court nor an agency should weigh lightly the potential risk to human life an
alternative might pose," the court was also concerned that "undue deference" to such
considerations might turn such inquiry into a "talisman" that might be cited in every §
167
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4(f) case to ensure approval or non-approval of a project or alternative depending on
the desired outcome.173 In the end, the court determined that even safety
considerations need to be "truly unusual factors" or "unique problems" in order to
justify the rejection of a non-parkland alternative.174 Here, the Secretary argued that
safety considerations justified rejection of the alignment that did not use parkland.175
These considerations included more complex traffic movements and more dangerous
and confusing ramp curves and interchanges that were associated with the nonparkland alignment.176 The court ruled, in this case, that the record was insufficient
to determine whether such safety issues were "unique."177 Nevertheless, the court's
pronouncement that even safety considerations must be of the "unique" or
extraordinary variety in order to merit the rejection of an alternative that does not use
protected lands is a considerable and additional hurdle for future projects to meet.
Turning to another matter that can often arise in § 4(f) litigation--reviewing a
"no build" alternative--the court again strictly interpreted § 4(f) and established a
stringent requirement for reviewing alternatives.178 The court stated that "[t]he mere
fact that a 'need" for a highway has been 'established' does not prove that not to build
the highway would be 'imprudent' under Overton Park."179 This statement makes it

173

Id. at 1452-53.

174

Id. at 1453.

175

Id. at 1452-53.

176

Id. at 1453.

177

Id.

178

Id. at 1455.

179

Id.

42

more difficult to dismiss or discount a no-build alternative. By citing Overton Park,
the court applied the "truly unusual factors" and "unique problems" criteria that must
be shown in order to reject an alternative.180 Moreover, "increased congestion or
commuter delays" were deemed to be not "so unusual or extraordinary that the No
Build [sic] alternative must be rendered imprudent."181 Thus, the court implies
almost a presumption for the no build alternative, since congestion and commuter
delays are often key factors in support of building a new highway. In this particular
case, the court ultimately held that the record did not adequately support a finding
that the no build alternative was imprudent.182
It should be noted with respect to the no build alternative discussion, that
Judge Wallace dissented on this issue. He argued that by insisting on a determination
as to the efficacy of a no build alternative, the court was "confusing the purposes" of
§ 4(f). Section 4(f) was not enacted as a threshold test on whether or not to build a
project, rather "Congress intended [§ 4(f)] to regulate which way a government
constructed a project."183 The position of the majority opinion on this issue
"improperly interferes with the cooperative system" of highway building.184
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3.

Druid Hills Civic Association v. Federal Highway Administration -11th Circuit

In Druid Hills Civic Association v. Federal Highway Administration, the 11th
Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated a proposed highway project in Atlanta, Georgia
part of which would impact the Druid Hills Historic District.185 The plaintiffappellant, the Druid Hills Civic Association, argued that the project was barred under
§ 4(f).186 The district court had denied an earlier motion to enjoin the construction of
the project.187
As with the previous cases, in fact as with virtually every § 4(f) case litigated
after Overton Park, its principles have served as a guide for the court.188 The court
restated many of the views espoused in the LES and Stop H-3 cases.189 In particular,
it noted that "[a]n alternate route that also impacts upon parks and historic sites is not
an 'alternative to the use' of such property."190 The court also made clear that there
are "no exceptions to the requirement that there be no prudent alternatives to the use
of parks and historic sites before the Secretary can approve a project using protected
properties."191 Again, this "no exceptions" language speaks to the stringency with
which some circuits, such as the 11th Circuit, have applied to § 4(f) cases.
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In the end, the court remanded the case to the Secretary so that additional and
more adequate findings could be made as to the issue of whether the chosen
alignment properly comported with § 4(f) requirements.192 In its directive to the
Secretary, the court noted that the review should "address the quantity of harm that
will accrue to the park or historic site and the nature of that harm, e.g., visual impact
or physical taking." The court continued on to note that "[i]t will not suffice to
simply state that an alternative route would affect 4(f) properties without providing
some rational, documented basis for such a conclusion." Such thorough, stringency is
the "command of Overton Park and LES II and we are not free to ignore that
directive."193

IV.

EXPLORING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTERPRETATIONS
The Department of Transportation, the FHWA and DOT's other modal

administrations, obviously, carefully scrutinize the judicial interpretations of § 4(f) to
assist them with their own application of § 4(f). Over the years, DOT has issued
several guidance and policy documents to help explain, interpret and contribute to the
understanding of § 4(f).194 It has also promulgated regulations195 regarding this
section, as well as established a nationwide § 4(f) permit program.196 The discussion
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below will review the key DOT regulations, guidance documents, and programs that
serve to help implement the directives of § 4(f).

A.

Section 4(f) Regulations
In the 1980's, DOT issued a regulation that provides additional substantive

details and procedural guidance on § 4(f).197 One of the main substantive provisions
included in the regulations is essentially a restatement of Overton Park principles
noting the following that the "Administration" may not approve a project that uses
protected lands unless "there are unique problems or unusual factors involved" with
such use or if "the cost, social, economic, and environmental impacts, or community
disruption" of such use rises to "extraordinary magnitudes."198 However, the
regulations do stipulate that some uses may not invoke § 4(f) protections. For
example, if the site being used is "not significant" based on a determination by
officials who have jurisdiction over the park, recreation area or refuge, then § 4(f)
review is not required.199 Also, the regulations recognize that certain "restoration,
rehabilitation, or maintenance" activities of transportation facilities that are on the
National Register of Historic Places are not subject to § 4(f).200 Although, the
regulations provide for some flexibility, they have not yet adopted some of the
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broader, more balanced approaches discussed in such cases as Eagle Foundation and
Hickory Neighborhood.201
In addition to an enunciation of the procedural requirements to be followed
when reviewing transportation projects under § 4(f), the regulations devote
considerable attention to defining and discussing the definition of "use" of a park,
recreation area, refuge, or historic area.202 The regulations state that a "use" occurs
when one of the following occurs: "land is permanently incorporated into a
transportation facility;" "a temporary occupancy of land [occurs] that is adverse in
terms of the statute's preservationist purposes;" or when there is a "constructive use of
land."203 The term "constructive use" is further defined as a use that "does not
incorporate land from a § 4(f) resource, but… [whose] impacts are so severe that the
protected activities, features, or attributes that qualify a resource for protection under
§ 4(f) are substantially impaired."204 Several examples of constructive uses that
trigger § 4(f) requirements, as well as examples of activities that are not subject to §
4(f), are also provided in the regulations.205 As would be expected, the above
definitions and the examples tend to track the body of § 4(f) case law.
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B.

Section 4(f) Policy Paper
In addition to promulgating § 4(f) regulations, the FHWA also issued a

detailed policy paper that is often cited in § 4(f) cases.206 This policy paper serves as
a reference document for § 4(f), and the stated purpose of the paper is to delineate
FHWA's policy positions that it adopted as a result of "court interpretations and many
years of project-by- project applications."207 It should be noted that this paper
"addresses only the programs and activities administered by FHWA."208
Nevertheless, it presents a useful (although legally non-binding) compendium of §
4(f) information.
The policy paper cites the Overton Park "unique problems" standard that must
be adhered to when reviewing a project alternative in light of § 4(f).209 In general, the
policy paper also closely follows the regulations. However, it does differ from the
regulations in one significant manner. The policy paper recognizes an important
gloss to the strict Overton Park standard--the "cumulation of problems" approach that
was articulated in Eagle Foundation.210 The paper specifically notes the following:
When making a finding that an alternative is not feasible and prudent, it is not
necessary to show that any single factor presents unique problems. Adverse
factors such as environmental impacts, safety and geometric problems,
decreased traffic service, increased costs, and any other factors may be
considered collectively.211
206
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This difference between the regulations and the policy paper reflects a split of sorts
within the DOT and further contributes to the confusion and debate among some
about the true scope and application of § 4(f).

C.

Nationwide § 4(f) Evaluations and Approvals
While no statutory changes have been made to § 4(f) since the 1983 and 1987

recodifications and modifications, one significant development did occur in how the
FHWA implements its responsibilities under § 4(f). In 1987, FHWA issued
guidelines that allowed for the "expedited approval of those federally-aided highway
projects having 'minor involvement' with historic sites, public parks, recreations
lands, and wildlife and waterfowl refuges."212 These guidelines are similar to other
"nationwide" permit programs used by the Army Corps of Engineers and other
agencies in the implementation of the Clean Water Act213 and allow agencies a degree
of efficiency in carrying out regulatory mandates. If a particular project or program
meets the conditions spelled out by the FHWA, then that project or program is
deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of § 4(f).214 For example, in
determining whether a project qualifies for a nationwide permit, the FHWA will
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examine conditions that "relate to the type of project, the severity of impacts to § 4(f)
property, the evaluation of alternatives, the establishment of a procedure for
minimizing harm to the § 4(f) property and adequate coordination with appropriate
entities."215 In effect, the FHWA will conduct a balancing test for the approval of a
nationwide permit.
The FHWA has approved nationwide programmatic evaluations for projects
in four major areas: "1. Independent Walkway and Bikeways Construction Projects;
2. Historic Bridges; 3. Minor Involvements with Historic Sites; and 4. Minor
Involvements with Parks, Recreation Areas and Waterfowl and Wildlife Refuges."216
The FHWA is quick to note that qualifying for one of the programmatic evaluations
"does not relax the § 4(f) standards, i.e., it is just as difficult to justify using § 4(f)
land with a programmatic § 4(f) evaluation as it is with an individual § 4(f)
evaluation."217 Despite this declaration, these programmatic guidelines, at their
inception, were controversial and viewed as a potential erosion of the protections
afforded by § 4(f).218 However, this view is not universally held, with many in the
transportation community viewing such guidelines as a responsible and efficient
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method for ensuring compliance with § 4(f). And, since the guidelines specifically do
not relax the scope or application of § 4(f), some may argue that § 4(f) is still too
stringently interpreted and implemented.

D.

Executive Order 13274 -- Environmental Stewardship and
Transportation Infrastructure Project Reviews
Responding to pressure from the transportation community as well as

recognizing a need to expedite the environmental review process, President George
W. Bush issued Executive Order 13274 on September 18, 2002 aimed at streamlining
the transportation project review process.219 This executive order directed agencies to
"take appropriate actions… to promote environmental stewardship in the Nation's
transportation system and expedite environmental reviews of high-priority
transportation infrastructure projects."220 In addition, the order called on the
Secretary of Transportation to "implement administrative, policy, and procedural
mechanisms that enable each agency… to conduct environmental reviews [and]… to
ensure completion of such reviews in a timely and environmentally responsible
manner."221
The order also required the Secretary to "designate" a list of "high-priority
transportation infrastructure projects that should receive expedited agency
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reviews,"222 and to establish a "Transportation Infrastructure Streamlining Task
Force" to assist with streamlining efforts, review projects, and "identify and promote
policies."223 It should be noted that the order made no substantive changes to § 4(f),
but the order was clearly aimed at easing the review process within the confines of
existing law.224 To that extent, its direct impact on § 4(f) is difficult to determine.
However, like the legislative actions that are detailed below (particularly those
occurring in the 107th and 108th Congresses), the executive order was important in
framing the § 4(f) debate and in advancing the broader issue of the need for reforms
of the environmental review processes. The efforts directed by the executive order
also proved to be successful according to the DOT.225 This success also helped build
the case that environmental streamlining initiatives make sense and should be
expanded, thus setting the stage for the transportation reauthorization process that is
discussed in more detail below.226
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E.

Bush Administration TEA-21 Reauthorization Proposal
The most recent Bush Administration response to § 4(f) came as part of its

comprehensive legislative proposal to reauthorize TEA-21.227 The Administration's
TEA-21 reauthorization proposal, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient
Transportation Equity Act of 2003 (known as SAFETEA), served as a starting point
for the reauthorization debate. It established broad transportation policy principles
important to the Administration, as well as details on how to effectuate those
policies.228 The House and Senate committees of jurisdiction received the
Administration proposal and used it as a reference point during the drafting stages for
their own TEA-21 reauthorization proposals.229
Indicating the importance that the Administration placed on § 4(f) reform, the
SAFETEA proposal included a separate and specific section dedicated to § 4(f)
reform. It proposed, essentially an entirely new § 4(f):
SEC. 1604. "SECTION 4(f)" POLICY ON LANDS, WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES.
Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
"§ 303. Policy on lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites
"(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and
public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and
historic sites.
227
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"(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult, when
appropriate, with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing and Urban
Development, and Agriculture, and with the States, in developing
transportation plans and programs that include measures to maintain or
enhance the natural beauty of lands crossed by transportation activities
or facilities.
"(c)(1) The Secretary of Transportation may approve a transportation
program or project requiring the use of publicly owned land of a public
park, recreation area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national,
State, or local significance, or land of a historic site of national, State,
or local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or local
officials having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge or site) only if-"(A) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to using that
land, and
"(B) the program or project includes all possible planning to
minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife and
waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from the use.
"(2) In making approvals under this subsection, the Secretary shall
apply the following standards:
"(A) The Secretary may eliminate an alternative as infeasible if
the Secretary finds that the alternative cannot be implemented
as a matter of sound engineering.
"(B) The Secretary shall consider the following when
determining whether it would be prudent to avoid the use of
land of a resource subject to preservation under this section:
"(i) The relative significance of the land of the resource
being protected.
"(ii) The views of the official or officials with
jurisdiction over the land.
"(iii) The relative severity of the adverse effects on the
protected activities, attributes, or features that qualify a
resource for protection.
"(iv) The ability to mitigate adverse effects.
"(v) The magnitude of the adverse effects that would
result from the selection of an alternative that avoids
the use of the land of the resource.
"(C) A mitigation measure or mitigation alternative under
paragraph (c)(1)(B) of this section is possible if it is feasible
and prudent. In evaluating the feasibility and prudence of a
mitigation measure or mitigation alternative under paragraph
(c)(1)(B) of this section, the Secretary shall be governed by the
standards of paragraphs (c)(2)(A) and (B) of this subsection.
"(d) The requirements of this section do not apply to-"(1) a project for a park road, parkway, or refuge road under
section 204 of title 23; or
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"(2) a highway project on land administered by an agency of
the Federal government, when the purpose of the project is to
serve or enhance the values for which the land would otherwise
be protected under this section, as jointly determined by the
Secretary of Transportation and the head of the appropriate
Federal land managing agency.
"(e) The requirements of this section are deemed to be satisfied where
the treatment of an historic site (other than a National Historic
Landmark) has been agreed upon in accordance with Section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f). The
Secretary, in consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, shall develop administrative procedures to review the
implementation of this subsection to ensure that the objectives of the
National Historic Preservation Act are being met.
"(f)(1) The Secretary may approve a request by a State to provide
funds made available under chapter 1 of title 23, United States Code,
to a State historic preservation office, Tribal historic preservation
office, or to the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to provide
the resources necessary to expedite the historic preservation review
and consultation process under section 303 of title 49 and under
section 470f of title 16, United States Code.
"(2) The Secretary shall encourage States to provide such funding to
State historic preservation officers, Tribal historic preservation officers
of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation where the investment
of such funds will accelerate completion of a project or classes of
projects or programs by reducing delays in historic preservation
review and consultation.
"(3) Such requests under paragraph (1) shall be approved only for the
additional amounts that the Secretary determines are necessary for a
State historic preservation office, Tribal historic preservation office, or
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to expedite the review
and consultation process and only where the Secretary determines that
such additional amounts will permit completion of the historic
preservation process in less than the time customarily required for such
process."230
The Administration's new § 4(f) proposal is notable in a number of respects.
Although it does not do away with the "feasible and prudent" requirements that have
been a part of § 4(f) since its inception, it does adopt a veritable balancing test similar
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to the approaches articulated in Eagle Foundation and its progeny.231 It also allows
for § 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act232 to be used in place of § 4(f)
requirements for historic sites. Finally, the Secretary is authorized to provide funds to
state historic preservation agencies to speed up the completion of reviews. The major
thrust of these provisions is to provide flexibility to the Secretary and provide him or
her with a menu of options to consider and use when evaluating a project under § 4(f)
principles.
Draft explanatory report language accompanying the SAFETEA proposal also
provides additional, key details on the Administration proposal.233 The explanatory
language notes that the new § 4(f) language "would facilitate the [§ 4(f) evaluation]
process by taking into consideration court decisions affecting the applicability of '§
4(f)' and codifying those factors that would more efficiently allow a prudent
decision."234 As justification for making these proposed changes, the Administration
notes that the current highway program has shifted away from new construction and
development and toward "system preservation and modernization, in which existing
facilities are the focus."235
The SAFETEA report also notes that "[t]he rigid rules for applying '§ 4(f)'
spawned from the early court decisions [and] are often an awkward fit for the
majority of situations faced today, where consequences to '§ 4(f)' properties are
231
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usually not as extreme."236 The Administration also cited cases such as Eagle
Foundation and Hickory Neighborhood as examples of "some later court decisions
[that] injected greater flexibility in interpreting '§ 4(f).'"237 It also referred to other
cases that have not been as flexible in their interpretation of § 4(f).238 These
differences in approaches and interpretations among some of the circuit courts of
appeal has caused a "disparity" that "has made it difficult to find a workable national
standard to use in reaching determinations of whether an alternative is prudent and
feasible."239 Therefore, according to SAFETEA, a reform of § 4(f) is needed "to
establish more national uniformity, and [to be] consistent with the changed impacts of
the highway program."240

V.

EXPLORING RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
Against the backdrop of over forty years of judicial and administrative

interpretation, actions during recent sessions of Congress have increasingly focused
their attention to § 4(f), with many influential committee leaders calling for reform.241
The following discussion examines the recent legislative actions regarding § 4(f) with
a specific emphasis on the developments that have occurred in 2003 and 2004 during
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the protracted and continuing reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (TEA-21). As will be seen, the calls for reform of the § 4(f)
requirements have been bipartisan. Additional support for change has also come
from many in the transportation community, while many in the environmental and
preservation communities have lined up to oppose these reform efforts.242

A.

H.R. 5455--ExPDITE ACT
During the 107th Congress, as the House and Senate began the initial TEA-21

reauthorization process, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) of the House Transportation
and Infrastructure Committee launched one of the first dedicated efforts aimed at
"streamlining" the environmental review processes that govern transportation
projects.243 This effort included the introduction of legislation, the Expediting Project
Delivery To Improve Transportation and the Environment Act (ExPDITE), aimed at
streamlining highway and transit projects, as well as a hearing244 on issues and
problems with the current environmental review processes for transportation projects.
These actions helped lay the groundwork for later, more specific actions regarding §
4(f) during TEA-21 reauthorization.
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1.

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Hearing

On October 8, 2002, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
held a hearing on Chairman Don Young's ExPDITE legislation. The hearing was
conducted as part of the process to reauthorize TEA-21.245 It included a variety of
witnesses, representing a spectrum of interests, including the following: American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American
Road and Transportation Builders Association (ARTBA); American Public
Transportation Association (APTA); American Highway Users Alliance; American
Council of Engineering Companies; Tri-State Transportation Campaign;
Environmental Defense; Defenders of Wildlife; Amalgamated Transit Union; and
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).246
From the witnesses presenting testimony, a strong endorsement for the
ExPDITE bill and for reforming § 4(f) came from John Horsley, Executive Director
of the AASHTO.247 In his prepared statement, he noted that AASHTO views "§ 4(f)
as one of the greatest causes of delay" in the development and construction of
transportation projects.248 He traced much of the problems with § 4(f) to the judicial
interpretations that "have accumulated over the past 30 years as a result of dozens of
court decisions," and he specifically singled out Overton Park as the source of much
245
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of the problems.249 According to Horsley, the "extraordinary magnitude" and "unique
problems" test championed by Overton Park has "converted § 4(f) into an extremely
rigid and unyielding statute, which often leads to absurd results--where minor § 4(f)
properties are protected at great expense, with little lasting benefit to the community
or the environment."250
As an example of the type of problems, costs and delays that a rigidlyinterpreted § 4(f) causes, Horsley cited a project in Kentucky that cost the state one
million dollars in order to comply with the § 4(f) mandates.251 In the Kentucky
example, the state was required to account and mitigate for an historic farmhouse in
order to proceed with a road project that required the taking of the farmhouse
property.252 In order to avoid the farmhouse, the state chose an alignment that
required the taking of a modern house; both the farmhouse and the modern home
were owned by the same person.253 The owner of the modern house used the money
from the state compensation that was paid to him in order to take the modern house
and used it to demolish the historic farmhouse and ultimately move the modern house
to the site of the historic farmhouse.254 Thus, in the end, one of the sole purposes of
§4(f)--preserving historic property--actually produced a result that destroyed historic
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property.255 This result, Horsley noted, is "not unique, [with] similar stories…
repeated in every state across the country."256
In order to remedy these types of results, AASHTO argues that a legislative
solution is needed.257 It would be "impossible for FHWA--even if wanted to--to
override the case law through a rulemaking."258 The AASHTO position is that "only
Congress has the power to get § 4(f) back on track and restore a degree of flexibility
and common sense."259
Horsley articulated the AASHTO position on § 4(f) which "mirror[s] the
elements of the ExPDITE bill."260 Four main elements comprise the suggestions for
reform.261 They include the following: (1) allowing projects to qualify for a finding
of no significant impact (FONSI)262; (2) "eliminat[ing] the concept of 'extraordinary
magnitude' from the definition of prudence once and for all, and replace it with a
more balanced and flexible definition;"263 (3) allowing the "substitution of Section
106 consultation under the National Historic Preservation Act for § 4(f) compliance
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for historic properties;"264 and (4) permitting an "exemption of the Interstate Highway
System from treatment as a historic resource."265
Representatives of the ARTBA266 and the APTA 267 echoed AASHTO's
support for § 4(f) reform. ARTBA's statement at the hearing concentrated on the
delays that § 4(f) compliance causes to transportation projects. In fact, according to a
study cited by ARTBA, § 4(f) is "the most common reason" for project delays.268
Another reason that ARTBA mentioned regarding § 4(f)'s rigidity is the fact that it
"predates most other federal environmental laws" and, thus has not had the historical
precedent and perspective from which some other, later environmental statutes have
benefited.269 APTA's statement also reiterated the positions of AASHTO and
ARTBA.270
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The pro-reform views, were, however, not the only views voiced during the
hearing. Representatives from the environmental community uttered their own
positions and criticisms of the ExPDITE legislation.271 Speaking for the Defenders of
Wildlife, William Snape, the organization's Vice President and Chief Counsel, took
issue with the claims of AASHTO and others.272 He cited studies concluding that
reasons other than environmental regulations were often the cause for project
delays.273 Snape was also particularly concerned about §103 of the ExPDITE bill that
proposed a number of changes to § 4(f) (see below for more detailed discussion on
the bill's proposed changes).274 On behalf of the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), Deron Lovaas also presented testimony critical of proposals to reform §
4(f).275 Like Snape, Lovaas offered information contrary to AASHTO's data
regarding the causes of transportation project delays.276 On the issue of § 4(f) reform,
he noted that the ExPDITE legislation "stacks the deck in favor of the Secretary of
Transportation's preferred projects by re-defining "prudent" and "feasible," thus
hampering a search for alternatives."277

271

See ExPDITE Hearing, supra note 243.

272

See ExPDITE Hearing (statement of William Snape, Vice President and Chief Counsel, Defenders
of Wildlife) available at http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/snape.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2004).
273

Id. at 2. One study cited by Snape indicated the top reasons for project delay were "lack of funding
or low priority," "local controversy," or "the inherent complexity of the project." Id.

274

Id. at 3-4.

275

ExPDITE Hearing (statement of Deron Lovaas, Deputy Director of the Smart Growth and
Transportation Program, Natural Resources Defense Council) available at
http://house.gov/transportation/highway/10-08-02/lovaas.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2004).

276

Id. at 2.

277

Id. at 3.

63

2.

Bill Language

Upon introduction of H.R. 5455, Chairman Don Young (R-AK) talked about
his primary reasons for introducing the bill. He observed that "[s]tudies have clearly
outlined the problems associated with America's growing highway congestion crisis,
which in 1999 alone, cost the nation $78 billion and led to the waste of 6.8 billion
gallons of gas."278 The problems to which Chairman Young referred were project
delays--delays that, he argues, creates "social, economic and environmental problems
throughout our nation."279
To tackle the problem of project delays, H.R. 5455 proposes a number of
revisions to environmental law that affect transportation projects.280 Specifically, in
the area of § 4(f), the bill makes significant changes. First--and perhaps most
significantly--it replaces the current statutory § 4(f) framework with a more flexible
and balanced approach.281 Section 103(c) of the bill rewrites the §4(f) requirements
by mandating that "the Secretary shall not approve any transportation project… that
has a significant impact on a protected resource."282 "Significance of impact" is to be
determined by
comprehensively, taking into account (A) the value of the protected resource;
(B) the value of the impacted land within the protected resource; (C) the
nature and extent of the impact on the protected resource after mitigation,
278

U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Press Release on the Introduction of
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measured both quantitatively and qualitatively and; (D) the views of the
official with jurisdiction over the protected resource, and, in the case of
private property, the views of the principal owner or owners of the property.283
This approach stands in sharp contrast to the Overton Park § 4(f) approach, as it
specifically allows for a balancing of various issues and interests in making a
determination as to whether a transportation project will impact a protected land.
The ExPDITE legislation also further attempts to streamline the approval of
projects under § 4(f) by requiring the issuance of regulations "listing categories of
projects that do not have the potential to cause significant impacts on protected
resources."284 This provision is similar to the nationwide programmatic evaluations
described above285 except that it appears to expand the type of categories eligible for
such streamlined consideration. Again, the primary thrust of the ExPDITE legislation
is to provide the Secretary with more flexibility and discretion to approve projects
when considered against the totality of circumstances, and a categorical approval
process furthers that goal.
This theme of flexibility also carries over to the provisions of ExPDITE that
detail how project alternatives are to be evaluated.286 If the Secretary finds that a
proposed project will have a significant impact on a protected property, then he or she
is required to "develop and evaluate alternatives, as part of the alternatives analysis
for the NEPA process, if any, for avoiding, minimizing, and mitigating the impacts of
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the project."287 This provision helps ensure the proposed project moves forward in a
timely manner by linking its review to the NEPA process, thereby reducing overlap
and redundant evaluations.
The bill also sets forth standards to guide the Secretary in evaluating and
selecting alternatives.288 Taking a cue from the current § 4(f) language, Section
103(f) states the Secretary may approve a project if:
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative that would entirely avoid
significant impacts on the protected resource; (2) there is no prudent and
feasible alternative that would substantially reduce significant impacts on the
protected resource when compared to the selected alternative; and (3)
appropriate measures to minimize the harm to the protected resource have
been incorporated into the selected alternative.289
The above language, however, differs significantly from current law. First, an
alternative must "entirely avoid" significant impacts. Second, the "unique problems"
standard is seemingly removed from the "prudent and feasible alternatives"
consideration as the alternatives, now, need only "substantially reduce" impacts in
order to be chosen. And, third, the "all possible planning" requirement under the
minimization of harms subsection of § 4(f) is replaced by a less strenuous
requirement to take "appropriate measures" to minimize harm.290
In an apparent attempt to address the "problems" of Overton Park mentioned
by AASHTO and others, the bill prescribes specific factors that must be assessed
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when determining the feasibility and prudence of a particular alternative.291 An
alternative is not "feasible" if the "alternative cannot be implemented as a matter of
sound engineering."292 In addition, an alternative is deemed not "prudent" if "the
Secretary finds that the drawbacks associated with that alternative clearly and
substantially outweigh its benefits."293 The ExPDITE bill underscores the need for
balancing by directing the Secretary to "assess the benefits and drawbacks of the
alternative as a whole, taking into account the alternative's ability to achieve the
project's objectives, the environmental and other impacts of the alternative (including
the impacts on protected resources), the cost of the alternative, and any other factors
deemed relevant by the Secretary."294 While the definition of "feasible" is clearly
derived from Overton Park295, the definition of "prudent" draws heavily from the
balancing discussion in Eagle Foundation.296 The drafters of ExPDITE have stitched
together key elements from two cases that have offered differing interpretations on
the scope of § 4(f) to produce a middle ground. They have also given the Secretary
additional discretion by allowing him or her to take into account factors as "relevant"
in determining a project's prudence.297
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Finally, ExPDITE proposes one additional change to the § 4(f) review
process, while also keeping--with minor modification--a key provision of § 4(f). In §
103(h), the bill allows compliance with § 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act to be substituted for compliance with the other provisions of H.R. 5455 when the
protected property at issue is an historic property.298 H.R. 5455, however, provides a
key exception to the § 106 compliance substitution provision. Sections 103(i-j) of
H.R. 5455 state that "any direct physical impact" or "any visual, audible, or
atmospheric impact" by the proposed project on a national historic landmark will be
deemed "adverse" to the landmark and shall not be approved by the Secretary.299 The
bill maintains the definition of protected properties (which it calls "protected
resources") but with one minor modification.300 Under the bill, historic properties are
defined as those that are deemed historic under the National Historic Preservation
Act301, as opposed to "historic site[s] of national, state, or local significance (as
determined by the Federal, state, or local officials having jurisdiction over the…
site)."302
Therefore, the bill, by not substantially changing the definition of protected
properties maintains the overall policy established by Congress in 1966 of protecting
valuable parklands, wildlife refuges and historic sites from encroachment by
298
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transportation projects. However, under the bill, the Secretary is now given the
flexibility and balance that Members of Congress sought when originally enacting §
4(f).303 Ultimately, the 107th Congress came to an end without H.R. 5455 moving
forward beyond the hearing stage, but the principles it outlined were to play an
important role in the reauthorization of TEA-21 as will be seen below.

B.

S. 3031 -- MEGA Act
During the 107th Congress, the Senate also joined the debate on environmental

streamlining with the introduction of S. 3031, the Maximum Economic Growth for
America Through Environmental Streamlining Act (MEGA).304 The bill's sponsor,
Senator Max Baucus (D-MT), during the introduction of the bill, discussed the goal
of the bill: provide for environmental streamlining.305 Environmental streamlining is
needed to "make the [environmental] permit and approval process work more
smoothly and effectively"306 The bill was introduced in large part due to Senator
Baucus' frustration with the DOT’s regulations that were promulgated as part of the
requirements of TEA-21.307 As Senator Baucus noted, "[t]hose regulations308 were
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supposed to help the State DOT's get their jobs done better and more efficiently--not
make their jobs harder."309 The proposed regulations required by TEA-21 received a
number of comments--many of which were negative, according to Baucus.
Ultimately, Baucus noted, DOT "went back to the drawing board and we never heard
from them again" through two different Administrations.310
While MEGA focuses primarily on "streamlining" the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, it also addresses § 4(f) issues.311 Section
2(a) of the bill authorizes state environmental reviews in lieu of DOT reviews to meet
the requirements of various environmental laws, including § 4(f). This provision,
which is similar to the manner in which other environmental laws are administered
(for example, the Clean Air Act)312, allows individual states to assume responsibility
for conducting the review process for certain projects provided the state can capably
carry out such review.313 The rationale behind this approach is that states will be able
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to respond more nimbly to local needs and issues than the federal government, and
can, therefore, more quickly move a project through the review process.314
The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held a hearing on this
bill and, as with the hearing on the House ExPDITE legislation, a variety of
transportation groups were represented at the hearing.315 Again, the testimony on
behalf of AASHTO was pivotal and supportive of § 4(f) reforms.316 AASHTO made
it clear that § 4(f) reform must be addressed during TEA-21 reauthorization.317 "The
core problem with § 4(f)," AASHTO noted, "is a lack of flexibility, balance, and
common sense." A stringently interpreted § 4(f) causes the DOT to be "in the
position of protecting a minor historic property at the expense of other, more sensitive
environmental resources or communities."318 Moreover, such strict interpretations
"undermine not only the credibility of individual decision-makers or agencies, but of
the NEPA process as a whole."319 In order to address these problems, AASHTO
restated many of its positions that it articulated during the House ExPDITE hearing,
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namely that § 4(f) be amended to allow exemptions for "projects that have 'no
significant impact' on § 4(f) lands."320
This hearing was important to advancing the concept of environmental
streamlining. It also signaled that the issue of § 4(f) reform was receiving bipartisan
support.321 The bill and the hearing also helped set the stage for addressing the issue
of § 4(f) reform in TEA-21 reauthorization--a legislative issue that was to rise to high
prominence in the 108th Congress as will be seen next.

C.

S. 1072 -- SAFETEA
The Senate, through the leadership of Senator James Inhofe (R-OK),

Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, initiated the first
serious congressional TEA-21 reauthorization efforts, with the introduction of S.
1072, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of
2003 on May 15, 2003.322 This bill essentially served as a vehicle to introduce the
Bush Administration's TEA-21 reauthorization proposal.323 However, the introduced
bill did not address the more controversial § 4(f) issues that were included in the
President’s SAFETEA version.324
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The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee marked up S. 1072 on
November 12, 2003 and reported it from the committee with amendment.325 This
committee-reported version, also was silent on specific § 4(f) reforms.326 The Senate
finally addressed the § 4(f) issues when it considered the bill on the floor in early
February 2004.327 Senator Voinovich (R-OH), a member of the Senate Subcommittee
on Transportation and Infrastructure of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works, offered an amendment during the floor debate that specifically addressed the
issue of § 4(f) reforms.328 Long a champion of § 4(f), Senator Voinovich offered this
amendment as a compromise and the amendment was supported by the National Trust
for Historic Preservation and the AASHTO.329
Senator Voinovich spoke at some length on his amendment, and he discussed
the importance of reforming § 4(f). His amendment allowed for a de minimis
exception to the provisions of § 4(f) for those transportation projects that have only
minimal impacts on § 4(f) protected lands. It also provided an "incentive for projects'
sponsors to incorporate environmentally protective measures into a project from the
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beginning" so that § 4(f) lands can be protected more efficiently.330 He
acknowledged that these reforms are only a compromise and that "many groups
would have preferred greater reform," presumably even Senator Voinovich
himself.331
One of the primary reasons for offering the amendment was the need to
harmonize disparate federal courts of appeals interpretations of § 4(f).332 Senator
Voinovich noted that "inconsistent interpretation of the Overton criteria …[justifies] a
more balanced interpretation of [§ 4(f)'s] requirements."333 Section 4(f), Senator
Voinovich argued, has become "a lawyer's dream and a nightmare for the courts that
have to interpret it and the States and U.S. Department of Transportation, which has
to enforce the law."334 This situation has resulted in "needless confusion, significant
delays, and high cost for issues that defy common sense."335
To help illustrate his case for reform, Senator Voinovich offered several
examples of situations in which § 4(f) either failed in its purpose of protecting
parklands, wildlife refuges, or historic properties or resulted in greater cost or delay
for the project at issue.336 He cited a case in Ohio where—because of § 4(f)
requirements—a highway had to be rerouted around a fifty-year old barn at a cost of
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$100,000 and a delay of four months.337 The irony behind this particular case was
that the “barn fell down due to owner neglect a few years later.”338 In another
example in Pennsylvania, he noted that § 4(f) requirements caused the destruction of
a non-historic farm in order to save an adjacent historic farm that, itself, was later
developed.339 Senator Voinovich argued that his “amendment would at least have
allowed the State preservation officer to make a balanced decision considering all of
the information and alternatives,” and therefore could have likely prevented the
outcomes in the above examples.340
Senator Voinovich’s amendment was ultimately incorporated into a larger
“manager’s amendment” offered by Chairman Inhofe.341 The Senate adopted this
amendment--Senate Amendment 2285--on February 12, 2004.342 Senate Amendment
2285, incorporating Senator Voinovich’s amendment, made a number of changes to
existing § 4(f) law and policy. The text of Senate Amendment 2285 follows:
SEC. 1514. PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES, AND HISTORIC SITES.
(a) PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITH DE MINIMIS IMPACTS-(1) TITLE 23.--Section 138 of title 23, United States Code, is
amended-(A) in the first sentence, by striking "It is hereby" and
inserting the following:
"(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.--It is"; and
337

Id. at S643. Senator Voinovich noted that this case could be a harbinger of things to come because
the age of the barn—fifty years—was the trigger for the § 4(f) review and ensuing mitigation efforts.
He observed that “[s]oon, we won’t be able to do any improvements because sidewalks will be fifty
years old in this country.” Id.
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(B) by adding at the end the following:
"(b) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS.-"(1) REQUIREMENTS.
``(A) IN GENERAL.--The requirements of this section
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a
transportation program or project will have a de
minimis impact on the area.
``(B) CRITERIA.--In making any determination under
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part
of a transportation program or project any avoidance,
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures
that are required to be implemented as a condition of
approval of the transportation program or project.
``(2) HISTORIC SITES.--With respect to historic sites, the
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impact only if-``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the consultation process required under section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.
470f), that-``(i) the transportation program or project will
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or
``(ii) there will be no historic properties affected
by the transportation program or project;
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written
concurrence from the applicable State historic
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
``(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in
consultation with parties consulting as part of the
process referred to in subparagraph (A).
``(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES.--With respect to parks, recreation
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may
make a finding of de minimis impact only if-``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and
opportunity for public review and comment), that the
transportation program or project will not adversely
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park,
recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible
for protection under this section; and
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``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over the
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.''.
(2) TITLE 49.--Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is
amended-(A) by striking ``(c) The Secretary'' and inserting the
following:
``(c) APPROVAL OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS.--Subject to subsection
(d), the Secretary''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(d) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS.-``(1) REQUIREMENTS.-``(A) IN GENERAL.--The requirements of this section
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a
transportation program or project will have a de
minimis impact on the area.
``(B) CRITERIA .--In making any determination under
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part
of a transportation program or project any avoidance,
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures
that are required to be implemented as a condition of
approval of the transportation program or project.
"(2) HISTORIC SITES.--With respect to historic sites, the
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impacts only if-"(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the consultation process required under Section 106 of
the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.
470f), that-``(i) the transportation program or project will
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or
``(ii) there will be no historic properties affected
by the transportation program or project;
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written
concurrence from the applicable State historic
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
``(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed in
consultation with parties consulting as part of the
process referred to in subparagraph (A).
``(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES.--With respect to parks, recreation
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may
make a finding of de minimis impact only if--
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``(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and
opportunity for public review and comment), that the
transportation program or project will not adversely
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park,
recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible
for protection under this section; and
``(B) the finding of the Secretary has received
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over the
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.''.
(b) CLARIFICATION OF EXISTING STANDARDS.-(1) IN GENERAL.--Not later than 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall (in consultation with
affected agencies and interested parties) promulgate regulations
that clarify the factors to be considered and the standards to be
applied in determining the prudence and feasibility of
alternatives under section 138 of title 23 and section 303 of
title 49, United States Code.
(2) REQUIREMENTS.--The regulations-(A) shall clarify the application of the legal standards to
a variety of different types of transportation programs
and projects depending on the circumstances of each
case; and
(B) may include, as appropriate, examples to facilitate
clear and consistent interpretation by agency
decisionmakers.
(c) IMPLEMENTATION STUDY.-(1) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary and the Transportation
Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences shall
jointly conduct a study on the implementation of this section
and the amendments made by this section.
(2) COMPONENTS.--In conducting the study, the Secretary and
the Transportation Research Board shall evaluate-(A) the processes developed under this section and the
amendments made by this section and the efficiencies
that may result;
(B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact
mitigation and avoidance commitments adopted as part
of projects conducted under this section and the
amendments made by this section; and
(C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are
considered de minimis under this section and the
amendments made by this section, including
information on the location, size, and cost of the
projects.
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(3) REPORT REQUIREMENT.--The Secretary and the
Transportation Research Board shall prepare-(A) not earlier than the date that is 4 years after the date
of enactment of this Act, a report on the results of the
study conducted under this subsection; and
(B) not later than September 30, 2009, an update on the
report required under subparagraph (A).
(4) REPORT RECIPIENTS.--The Secretary and the Transportation
Research Board shall-(A) submit the report and update required under
paragraph (3) to-(i) the appropriate committees of Congress;
(ii) the Secretary of the Interior; and
(iii) the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation; and
(B) make the report and update available to the
public.343
While this amendment does not fully adopt the broad-reform minded
principles espoused in the Bush Administration's § 4(f) proposal, it does make a
number of significant changes to § 4(f). It allows for a de minimis impacts exception
for those projects that have only a minor effect on § 4(f) protected lands.344 And, in
making this de minimis determination, the Secretary of Transportation is directed to
consider "any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures" taken
by the project.345 This provision does provide the Secretary with a measure of
flexibility when reviewing and evaluating projects. The DOT is also required to
promulgate regulations "clarify[ing] the factors to be considered and the standards to
be applied in determining the prudence and feasibility of alternatives."346 In addition,
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S. 1072 § 1514. This section incorporates the Senate Amendment 2285's changes and additions to
the original version of S. 1072.
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subsection (c) of the amendment directs a joint study on the implementation of this
section to be undertaken by DOT and the Transportation Research Board of the
National Academy of Sciences.347
The ranking member of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, Senator Jeffords (I-VT) spoke in support of the Voinovich § 4(f)
amendment. In summarizing the need for, and provisions of, the amendment, he
noted the following:
An amendment to 4(f) is included in this legislation. The objective of this
amendment is to allow transportation projects and programs to move forward
more quickly, while maintaining the protections of 4(f). Those protections
assure that there will be public notice and opportunity for public review and
comment on proposed de minimis determinations for transportation projects,
and that affected agencies will concur in the decision of the Secretary of
Transportation that there will be no adverse impact on a historic site,
recreation area, park, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge.348
The amendment, Senator Jeffords argued, will also encourage front-end consideration
of mitigation measures and other environmental planning initiatives.349 The
provisions of the amendment, according to Senator Jeffords are "modest, commonsense" and "assure the transportation planners will consider the location of important
habitat, wetlands and other natural resources at the earliest stages of planning for new

347

S. 1072 § 1514(c). This study is to be completed within four years after the date of enactment of
the Act. Id. at § 1514(c)(3)(A). The study is required to include an evaluation of "(A) the processes
developed under this section and the amendments made by this section and the efficiencies that may
result; (B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact mitigation and avoidance commitments
adopted as part of projects conducted under this section and the amendments made by this section;
[and] (C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are considered de minimis under this section and
the amendments made by this section, including information on the location, size, and cost of the
projects." Id. at § 1514(c)(2)(A-C).
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roads."350 The effect of such early planning will be cost-savings for states and local
departments of transportation, as well as better environmental protections.351 The
Inhofe amendment, with the Voinovich § 4(f) language, was ultimately adopted by
the Senate on February 12, 2004, and S. 1072 was also approved on the same day by
a vote of 76-21, with three Senators not voting.352

D.

H.R. 3350 -- TEA-LU
While the Senate proceeded with S. 1072 as its offering in the TEA-21

reauthorization process, the House moved forward on a parallel track with the
introduction of H.R. 3550, the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (TEALU).353 Unlike the Senate approach in S. 1072 as amended, TEA-LU focuses only on
historic sites and remains silent on other protected lands such as parklands and
wildlife refuges.354 Section 6003 of TEA-LU states the following:
SEC. 6003. POLICY ON HISTORIC SITES.
(a) TITLE 49.--Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
"(d) SPECIAL RULES FOR HISTORIC SITES.-"(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed
to be satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic
site has been agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the
350

Id.
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Id. Senator Jeffords noted the following: "State and Federal agencies spend considerable time and
money both protecting natural areas and building transportation infrastructure. Unfortunately,
conservation and growth efforts often happen independently and then come into conflict during the
permitting and construction phases of a transportation project. These investments need to be
coordinated. If conservation efforts are taken into account at the earliest stages of transportation
planning, both priorities can be realized, in less time and at less cost." Id.

352

Id. Senators Kerry (D-MA), Edwards (D-NC) and Nelson (D-NE) did not vote.
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agreement includes a determination that the program or project
will not have an adverse effect on the historic site.
`(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not
apply in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation determines, concurrent with or prior to the
conclusion of section 106 consultation, that allowing section
106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this section
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National
Historic Preservation Act. The Council shall make such a
determination if petitioned to do so by a section 106 consulting
party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the views of
the requesting party have been adequately considered and that
section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic
properties.
`(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following definitions
apply:
`(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term `section
106 consultation' means the consultation process
required under section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f).
`(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect' means
altering, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics
of a historic property that qualify the property for
inclusion in the National Register in a manner that
would diminish the integrity of the property's location,
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or
association.'.
(b) Title 23- Section 138 of title 23, United States Code is amended-(1) by inserting `(a) POLICY- ' before `It is'; and
(2) by striking `In carrying' and inserting the following:
`(c) STUDIES- In carrying'; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) (as designated by
paragraph (1)) the following:
`(b) SPECIAL RULES FOR HISTORIC SITES`(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed
to be satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic
site has been agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the
National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the
agreement includes a determination that the program or project
will not have an adverse effect on the historic site.
`(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not
apply in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation determines, concurrent with or prior to the
conclusion of section 106 consultation, that allowing section
106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this section
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National
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Historic Preservation Act. The Council shall make such a
determination if petitioned to do so by a section 106 consulting
party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the views of
the requesting party have been adequately considered and that
section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic
properties.
`(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following
definitions apply:
`(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term
`section 106 consultation' means the
consultation process required under section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act (16
U.S.C. 470f).
`(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect'
means altering, directly or indirectly, any of the
characteristics of a historic property that qualify
the property for inclusion in the National
Register in a manner that would diminish the
integrity of the property's location, design,
setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or
association.'.355
The House provision, by focusing only on historic sites, does not provide the
broader flexibility sought by the Bush Administration and the Senate. Nevertheless,
it does provide some "streamlining" to the § 4(f) program in terms of allowing
compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act to be deemed as also in
compliance with the provisions of § 4(f) as they relate to historic sites.356 The House
approved TEA-LU, with the § 4(f) amendment concerning historic sites, on April 2,
2004 by a vote of 357-65.357
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E.

TEA-21 Reauthorization Conference Committee Consideration
Although the actions by the Senate and the House earlier this year regarding §

4(f) represented significant steps on the road to reform, the path ahead remains
uncertain and not without potential obstacles. The House and Senate completed floor
consideration of their bills by April 2004, yet, to date, differences between their
respective bills have not been resolved by the House-Senate conference committee.358
Although a number of non-controversial items have been addressed and resolved by
the conference committee, debate over the bill's overall funding levels (an issue
unrelated to § 4(f) reform) had caused the bill to remain stuck in the conference
committee.359 Resolution on the funding issues is necessary before the conference
committee is expected to tackle thornier issues such as environmental streamlining
and § 4(f) reform.360 As Congress enters its summer recess period, prospects for
resolving differences are unclear, with some commentators believing that it will be
very difficult, if not impossible, to complete a bill before the November elections.361

VI.

ARRIVING WHERE WE STARTED -- THE FUTURE OF § 4(f)
Given the current--stalled--status of the TEA-21 reauthorization effort, it is

uncertain if § 4(f) reforms can be made in 2004.362 The TEA-21 reauthorization
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process also represents the most likely legislative vehicle for making changes to §
4(f), therefore, if this process is not completed during the 108th Congress, proponents
for change will have to start the process anew in the 109th Congress. In addition,
with the possibility of political changes in the House, Senate and/or the White House,
the final path of § 4(f) reforms could also change if the process drags out into next
year.
Indeed, the recent and current environment surrounding § 4(f) is unparalleled
in the statute's history. For the first time since its creation in 1966, a concerted
legislative and political effort is underway to reform § 4(f). How this effort evolves
remains to be seen; however, the TEA-21 reauthorization process has forced, at the
very least, a re-examination of a statute that has served as a key component of
environmental and historic preservation law. And, given the bipartisan support for at
least some changes to § 4(f)363, it appears that change is in the future for § 4(f).

A.

Possibilities for Change
With this backdrop in mind, it is useful to look at some of the possibilities for

change that may exist for § 4(f). Many of these proposed changes seek a return to the
principles of flexibility and balance denoted in the conference report floor debate on
the original § 4(f). Among the many suggestions for reforming § 4(f), the following
proposals have received the most attention:

363
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•

adopting a de minimis exception for projects that have an insignificant impact
on § 4(f) protected lands;364

•

expanding the current nationwide permits approach;365

•

allowing the Secretary to engage in a balancing test when determining
whether or not a proposed project will use or affect a § 4(f) protected land;366

•

ensuring that maintenance of existing facilities does not trigger § 4(f)
protections;367

•

allowing compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation
Act to satisfy § 4(f); and368

•

permitting the states to take a more active and up-front role in the enforcement
and application of § 4(f).369

B.

Going Back to the Future
As the discussion above has revealed, these proposals for change bubbled up

over many years--often as a response to court cases and/or specific projects. When
analyzing the voluminous case law comprising § 4(f) jurisprudence, it is also useful to
do so in the context of the original legislative history that accompanied the creation of
§ 4(f). Indeed, one of the best guides for determining what the future may hold is to
364
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look to the past. To paraphrase T.S. Eliot, the result of exploration is often to arrive
back from whence one came and to know it for the first time. In this case, that means
turning back to the legislative history of § 4(f), so that we can “know” § 4(f) for the
first time. Proponents for changing § 4(f) would be well-served to cite the statements
made by Congressmen Kluczynski and Rostenkowski in 1966 during the debate of
the DOT Act. Although, these statements are obviously (and some would argue,
merely) legislative history, they are nevertheless prescient and persuasive as to the
need to have flexibility and balance in the § 4(f) program. These statements also
serve as the best evidence available as to how § 4(f) was viewed by those called upon
to vote to approve or not approve it.

1.

Restoring § 4(f)'s Legislative Roots

As discussed above, the legislative history concerning the original conference
report that spawned the current § 4(f) is revealing.370 Referencing the committee and
other debate that took place during the development of the original § 4(f) language,
Congressman Rostenkowski observed that "[i]t was made clear at the time that as
desirable as parkland preservation might be, other important factors must be
considered."371 Congressman Rostenkowski could "easily forsee circumstances when
it may be vital to use such [protected] lands."372 He offered specific examples, "[f]or
instance, if it became necessary to choose between preserving a wildlife refuge or
saving human lives by a highway improvement, I do not think any of us would have
370
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any doubt as to which choice should be made. Or if there were a choice between
using public parkland or displacing hundreds of families, with the attendant burden
imposed on them, I would want the Secretary to weigh his decision carefully, and not
feel he was forced by the provision of the bill to disrupt the lives of hundreds of
human beings."373
It is interesting to note that the statements of Congressmen Kluczynski and
Rostenkowski are seldom cited or mentioned in the many cases and policy debates
that have occurred since § 4(f)'s creation. This fact is even more interesting
considering these statements represent the only substantive comments made by
Members of Congress during the legislative debate on the conference report for the
DOT Act of 1966. Surely, the current Congress and other policy and judicial
decision-makers would benefit from a review of these statements. Efforts to change,
re-examine, or reform § 4(f) should start first with an analysis of the early history of
the creation of § 4(f).

2.

Mending the Judicial Split

Much has happened in the transportation and environmental law and policy
arenas since § 4(f) arrived on the scene nearly forty years ago. The case law
interpreting the scope and application of § 4(f), over this time period, has not fully
clarified the reach of § 4(f). Rather, the true meaning of § 4(f) has been made murky
by the differing approaches that certain courts of appeals have adopted. In addition to
reviewing the legislative history of § 4(f), it also is necessary to enact a clear
statement on how § 4(f) should be interpreted, implemented and enforced. A clear
373
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statement by Congress addressing the split among the circuits over the issue of how
strictly § 4(f) should be interpreted would be of great benefit to all participants in the
process--transportation planners and builders, environmentalists and historic
preservationists.374 Providing a resolution to this judicial split could be found in §
4(f)'s original legislative history--a history that suggests rigor but also balance and
flexibility.375
The recent legislative efforts made by Senators Voinovich and Inhofe and
Congressman Don Young and others reveal, perhaps, a possible new path for § 4(f).
By allowing for flexibility in administering the § 4(f) process, this recent legislative
approach might restore balance between the often competing, yet always intertwined,
camps of the transportation planners and engineers and the environmentalists.
Regardless of the outcome of the TEA-21 reauthorization process and whether or not
it ultimately includes § 4(f) reform language along the lines of the recent Senate or
House approaches, the issue of balancing these interests will not go away anytime
soon. After nearly forty years, the moment for change has arrived, and it is unlikely
that those Senators, Members of Congress, associations and other interested parties
and advocates for change will retire from the field without at least partial resolution
as to how § 4(f) should be interpreted and applied. The coming months will likely be
the beginning of a new, more clarified, path for § 4(f) jurisprudence.
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